

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Date: 4 December

TO: DCI

16 DEC 1985

FROM:

SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

Two memos from

- 1) Preparations for Upcoming Arms Control Talks
- 2) Status Report on Soviet Nuclear Testing

A
C
T
I
O
N

25X1

SECRET/NOFORN

ACIS 1646/85
3 December 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director for Central Intelligence ✓ --EYES ONLY--
Deputy Director for Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Intelligence

FROM: [REDACTED]
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

25X1

SUBJECT: Preparations for Upcoming Arms Control Talks (S/NF)

1. This note is for your information unless you have any additional actions you desire. (U)

2. [REDACTED] Arms Control Support Group met yesterday on preparations for upcoming work. Based on that meeting, it appears that the Executive Branch is transfixed on Round IV of the NST Talks and will do the following:

25X1

- NST: The Interdepartmental Groups (IG) will continue their classic types of regular work programs to flesh out the recent US NST proposal. In addition, they will be asked to prepare short papers on strategy and themes for Round IV, due in about two weeks, and draft instructions for the delegation, due the first week in January. The SACG will meet on about 7 January to review the instructions. This is where the next major fight on arms control is likely to occur. An NSC/NSPG meeting may be held later that week if necessary.
- SCC: The Backstopping Group will meet next week to prepare the work program for the next round, which begins in early March and will be long.
- RSVP: The second part of the OSD report on "Response to Soviet Violations Policy," is said to be in early draft and OSD says it intends to provide it to the White House by the end of the year. OSD is vague about whether or not anyone else will see the report. Mr. McFarlane earlier had said that the SACG would engage the issue; this is now unclear.
- SALT II: There is nothing specific being said about extension of the President's mutual restraint policy, from June 1985, regarding SALT II. We suspect the US intends to drift along with SALT II, without apparently getting anything out of the Soviets in return -- specifically, as an example, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As you know, we've raised this issue in the past, but to no avail.


25X1
25X1DCI
EXEC
REG

25X1

SECRET/NOFORN

- Compliance: This work is almost completed. The report was due on the 1st of December, but the Executive Branch slipped it to the 20th. We will give you in the next several days a copy of the decision document and the issue papers themselves. In the meantime, we will be watching over or establishing positions for US intelligence, and I may have to call you to clear one or two major positions prior to their use.
- Verification: The NSC Staff has expressed interest in moving forward on verification, largely to underscore the Geneva language about effective verification, but no specific work has been tasked. We volunteered to write a "provocative" paper, which we call "Verification in the mid-1980s," to address this critical issue in a modern, comprehensive way. You will see it well before it is done. In addition, we are pushing on specific verification issues in the individual IG papers. (S/NF)
3. This is a fairly low-key and deliberate schedule; whatever acceleration may take place seems more likely to come out of individual efforts, such as Ken Adelman's, rather than the Executive Branch's bureaucracy. (S/NF)
4. I think there can be no doubt that Bud McFarlane's personal situation, as exposed in the newspapers, has contributed to the approximate silence in the arms control arena. The holiday season no doubt has contributed some as well. In my opinion, an additional element is the possibility that there will be other personnel changes in the top of the Executive Branch's arms control team. If I didn't know any better, I would say that some, or several, of these personnel changes have been in the making for some time. (S/NF)
5. In any case, I think the next six months (or more) are going to be an extremely busy time for arms control. My guess is that there will be intense pressure within the Executive Branch -- much less within and from the Congress -- to invent arms control deals which arguably are in the US interest and therefore worthy for negotiation with the USSR. We'll see. (S/NF)
6. If there is anything more we can do for you here, please call. (U)

25X1



ACIS - 1649/85
4 December 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence

--EYES ONLY--

FROM:

[redacted]
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

SUBJECT: Status Report on Soviet Nuclear Testing (C/NF)

1. This "fast-track" memorandum is both for your information and action, and you may care to issue instructions/guidance. (U)

2. As you no doubt recall, US intelligence and certain portions of the Defense and DOE technical communities have been working hard during the last year [redacted]

[redacted] Recently, you received from the Director of DIA the final report of the Technical Review Panel conducted by DIA, in response to your request earlier in 1985. Chairman, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee and I have the action (albeit delayed slightly), from the Executive Secretary, to provide you comments on this DIA study. (C/NF)

3. In this regard, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) has been addressing what to recommend to you [redacted]

[redacted] It became fairly clear Tuesday at a JAEIC meeting that DIA wants to delay a decision and may even disagree with the results of the technical review panel it conducted. Ch/JAEIC will be forwarding to you eventually a recommendation (including differing views, if any) in the near future. (C/NF)

4. Concurrently, the Executive Branch has been working on a number of arms control compliance issues for the report to the Congress mandated by the FY 86 Defense Authorization Bill. That report, originally due on 1 December, has been tentatively slipped by the Executive Branch to 20 December--just before Congress adjourns. As this work has proceeded and the results have arrived from the various DoD technical panels, it has become increasingly clear that the consensus in the Executive Branch of 1984 on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) compliance issue has fractured--probably permanently. (This is no great loss, in my view.) (C/NF)

SECRET/NOFORN

Page Denied

SECRET/NOFORN

25X1

9. This memorandum has been read by the Acting Director, OSWR and the Chairman/JAEIC; they concur and any views have been incorporated. (OUO)

10. If there is anything further we can do to assist you here, please call and let me know. (U)

25X1

SECRET/NOFORN